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II. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals, following an 
appeal from the Fourth District Court in and for Wasatch County. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to § 78-2a-3(2) (h) . 
vi 
III. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. 
A. DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND ERR IN FAILING TO MAKE 
ADEQUATE FINDINGS TO SUPPORT ITS ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. In imputing income to the Appellant based on voluntary 
underemployment? 
2. In its child support award for seven children? 
3. In failing to award Appellant alimony? 
4. In awarding Appellee the benefits of any pay-down by 
Appellant of the mortgage upon the marital home and the benefits of 
its appreciated value as of the date of pay-off by Appellant to 
Appellee of his equitable interest in the home. 
5. In failing to require Appellee to pay the parties' entire 
USAA debt? 
6. In failing to award Appellant her requested attorney's 
fees? 
7. Appellant also requests attorney's fees and costs of 
Court for the prosecution of this appeal. 
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IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard or ret^iev - i:Tr^rcc rr-^eedings is that the 
Trial Court has consiaera^.. _- . Appellate 
Court v.:]'. nor disturb the Trial Court" r decision unless i 1: is 
clear"- :-••• :-- JI a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751 
P.2d, ii4y rjtah At: :~"*. 
r^
 rov.Tr:r r.^ pe"1 lare rev: e1 '- ' ',>"- De -dequate factual 
Finding^ .__ . . 
v. Willey, ?!-* t.^d 1149 iUtan App. l99o7 , A\illey * . rvilley, 333 
Utah Adv. Rpt ° 'Utah 1997x 
. oel Ianr request "na: her actua: -ncome b>- use-J for 
asses. .. .-• .- .. , . .."- ' * ' ;::.- ; :: * 
P, :. -*-12; ana those issues reserves ey ::i- Cuiit .it the 
conclusion of rh& ^r*-^ •'Transcript 
Appr- . .;.. . -i -i . . 
those fees and C O S L S on appeal was preserved :.- Court's 
Memorandum Decision
 vk. 160) and her testimony (Transcript, P. 108. 
I i 
The issue of the Appellant's request fox alimony was preserved 
by he: r.e?1" imrv-' 'Transcript z- ' C)i ': • -:id Appellant '° ^' i:n 
r ^ y ^ , ^ • . 
testimony (Transcript , . Tne issae or the distribution 
of the USAA debt was preserved by the pleadings (R. P. "/ j and 
testimony of the parties (Transcript P. 25 L. 3) and the Memorandum 
Decision (R. 159) as was Appellant's claim for child support for 
the seven minor children (Transcript, P. 100, L. 19). Appellant 
also objected to Appellee's child support worksheet (R. P. 35) 
(Transcript, P. 28). 
IX 
V. 
STATUTES 
Disposition of Property - Maintenance and health care of 
parties and children - Division of debts - Court to have 
continuing ji irisdiction Custody and visitation 
Det erminat ion of al imony Nonmer i t or ious pet. i t ion 102: 
modification. 
When a decree of divorce is rendered the court may 
include it in equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
d "^ t s 02: obligations, and parties. Th <° • * * - ^ <=r "! :1 11 c ] i 1 d e t h P 
Lowing in every decree of divorce; 
(a) An order assigning responb^L;... .
 : for the payment 01 
reasonable and necessary medical and ^- " »yppn?es o^ *-hp 
dependent children; 
(b) If coverage is cr become avai lable at a reasonable 
CIJJDL, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, Hospital and dental care insurance for the 
1 Impendent children 
(~ """, T ^ drill L, U U O t . 5 : 
va./ an order - wnicii party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations or 
liabilities of the par*-* - contracted incurred 
during marriage. 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' 
separate, current addresses; and 
(iii' provisions for the enforcement ~ these 
;rders; and 
(d^ r /-L^iuiib for income *.,:.,. . . u m y .ui ao^w-LU-* 
,. . ;..h Title 62A, Chapter 1.1, Recovery Services 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent 
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the 
custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances 
are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent 
to provide child care for the dependent children,, necessitated by 
the pmpl nvTUfi*- or training of the custodial parent. 
x 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution 
of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
(4)(a) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the court 
shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include an order 
establishing a visitation schedule a provision, among 
other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a 
court ordered visitation schedule entered under this 
chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is denied, the court shall 
order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys fees expended 
by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines 
that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended 
against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the 
immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation 
right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award 
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney's fees and 
court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other 
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following 
factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii)the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony; 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). However, 
the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable 
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard 
of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
xi 
marriage, the court may consider the standard .ivina that 
existed at the time of the marriao 
(d) The court may, UT- . apprupr^at^ ^-.uumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties :-L\-ctive standards of living. 
(e ) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
thresiiuxu of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due 
to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered 
in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of 
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, 
the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short 
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born 
di iring the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to 
t1' * condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
rhe court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
SUJJ vjiiciuj^ s and new orders regarding alimony based on a 
sub* _ material change in circumstances not forseeable at the 
time of the divorce. 
(ii) The cour t may i,, . _ .t . lew 
order ::r alimony to addr ess neet .e rec _ . . chat did not 
exist ,-r: \he time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income .,f any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not oe considered, except as 
provided in this subsection 
(A) The court i ._. consider the r-'^^cru^r1.^ 
spouse's financial ability to share l:v::ia - xpensei 
(B) The court may consider the a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds tha- the pavo: 4,,er 
conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordereu ..r a uaraLicii ^.onyei 
than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any 
time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment r*f -r. imony for - n ~nger 
period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce --cifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon 
the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the 
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying 
alimony is made a party : xion of annulment and 
his rights are determined, 
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(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals Jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary. 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and 
decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the district court review of information 
adjudicative proceeding so the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division 
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the State 
engineer. 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-
46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a 
first degree or capital felony. 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony. 
xiii 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the 
vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court 
for original appellate review and determination any matter of which 
the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its 
review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
xiv 
78-45-7.2 Application of guidelines - Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative 
order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered 
on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a 
rebuttal presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of 
temporary or permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and 
considerations required by the guidelines, the award amounts 
resulting from the application of the guidelines, the use of 
worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record 
supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the 
guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the 
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best 
interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who 
live in the home of that parent and are not children in common to 
both parties may at the option of either party be taken into 
account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child 
support award, as provided in Subsection (5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute 
the obligations of the respective parents for the additional 
children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the 
appropriate parent!s income before determining the award in the 
instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
consideration of natural or adoptive children other than those in 
common to both parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in 
the award but may not be applied to justify a decrease in the 
award. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the 
guidelines and any subsequent change in the guidelines constitutes 
a substantial or material change of circumstances as a ground for 
modification or adjustment of a court order, if there is a 
difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the 
guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., the office may request 
modification, in accordance, with the requirements of the Family 
Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485, no more often than once 
every three years. 
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Section 78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income - Imputed income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including 
nonearned sources, except under Subjection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, 
bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, 
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony 
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social 
security benefits, workers1 compensation benefits, 
unemployment compensation, disability insurance benefits, 
and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income earned from earned income sources is limited to 
the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only 
if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent 
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, the 
court may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the 
parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from the gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) Benefits received under a housing subsidy program, 
the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.I. , Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, or General Assistance; and 
(c) Other similar means-tested welfare benefits received 
by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a 
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary 
expenses required for self-employment or business 
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be 
reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross 
income available to the parent to satisfy a child support 
award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted 
from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may 
differ from the amount of business income determined for 
tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed 
on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the 
average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current 
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs 
or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns 
from at least the most recent year unless the court finds 
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the verification is not reasonably valid. Verification 
of income from records maintained by the Office of 
Employment Security may be substituted for pay stubs, 
employer statements, and income tax returns, 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to 
determine whether an underemployment or overemployment 
situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under 
Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the 
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is 
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall 
be based upon employment potential and probable earnings 
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall 
be imputed as least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-
hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge 
in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an 
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings 
of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following 
conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the 
parents' minor children approach or equal the 
amount of income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) if a parent is physically or mentally disabled 
to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or 
occupational training to establish basic job 
skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child 
require the custodial parent's presence in the 
home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child 
who is the subject of a child support award nor benefits 
to a child in the child's own right such as Supplemental 
Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to 
the earnings of a parent may be credited as child support 
to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by 
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of 
that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be 
xvii 
considered as income to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case. 
§ 78-45-7.7 Calculation of obligations. 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided 
between them in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless 
the low income table is applicable. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split 
custody as defined in Section 78-45-2 and in cases where the 
obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less monthly, the base 
child support award shall be determined as follows: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents 
and determine the base combined child support obligation 
using the base combined child support obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the 
base combined child support obligation by multiplying the 
combined child support obligation by each parent's 
percentage of combined adjusted gross income. 
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the 
obligor is between $650.00 and $1,050, the base child support award 
shall be the lesser of the amount calculated in accordance with 
Subsection (2) and the amount calculated using the low income 
table. 
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides 
combined child support obligations for up to six children. For 
more than six children, additional amounts may be added to the base 
child support obligation shown. Unless rebutted by Subsection 78-
45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be less than the amount 
which would be ordered for up to six children. 
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is 
$649 or less, the court or administrative agency shall determine 
the amount of the child support obligation on a case by case basis, 
but the child support award shall not be less than $20.00. 
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for 
the total number of children, not an amount per child. 
Rule 4-912. Child Support Worksheets. 
Intent: 
To assist judges and commissioners in applying the statutory 
child support guidelines to determine child support awards. 
To assist the Administrative Office in collecting data 
regarding child support awards in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 667. 
xviii 
Applicability: 
This rule applies to every final order of child support, 
including modifications of existing awards. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) The parties shall prepare a worksheet containing 
information set forth in Appendix G. If the filing party is the 
Office of Recovery Services, the section on "child care adjustment" 
need not be completed. 
(2) The parties shall file a completed worksheet with the 
court and the information thereon shall be provided to the 
Administrative Office of the Court. 
(A) If the information on the worksheet is not 
electronically transferred to the Administrative Office by the 
filing party, that party shall file the worksheet in duplicate 
with the court. The clerk of court shall send one copy of the 
worksheet to the Administrative Office. 
(B) If the information on the worksheet is 
electronically transferred to the Administrative Office by the 
filing party, the party shall so indicate on the worksheet and 
shall file a single copy of the worksheet with the court. 
(3) The court shall not enter the final decree of divorce, 
final order of modification, or final decree of paternity until the 
completed worksheet is filed. 
(4) The Administrative Office shall compile the data 
contained on the worksheet and shall annually provide a report to 
the Child Support Guidelines Advisory Committee regarding the 
compiled data. (Added effective April 15, 1995.) 
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VI. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. NATURE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION. 
The nature of this case is an appeal from a Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce resulting from a trial held on November 21, 1996 
before the Honorable Howard Maetani at the Wasatch County 
Courthouse in Heber City, Utah. Following the trial, the Court 
ordered that the parties' counsel submit proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as to the issues of child support, alimony, 
the marital residence, premarital property and attorney's fees. 
Thereafter, the Court made and entered its Memorandum Decision in 
February of 1997 and a Supplemental Decree was prepared by 
Appellee's counsel which was objected to. Thereafter, the Court 
made and entered its Supplemental Memorandum Decision on April 29, 
1997, and thereafter the Court entered a Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce, but failed to enter adequate and sufficient Findings of 
Fact or a Child Support Worksheet to support its Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce from which Appellant herewith appeals. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. DiAnn (Defendant and Appellant) and Melvon David Turner 
(Plaintiff and Appellee) were married on March 18, 1966, in Logan, 
Utah (Divorce Complaint, R. P. 1). 
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2. During their marriage, they had 12 children (Divorce 
Complaint, R. P. 1), seven (7) of whom were minor children at the 
time of trial on November 21, 1996 (Transcript, P. 96, L. 9) 
including one who had turned 18 on November 7, 1996, but who had 
not yet graduated from high school (Transcript P. 29). 
3. At trial, Mr. Turner was employed at the Utah Department 
of Employment Security (Transcript P. 12, L. 4), earning $53,534.00 
per year or $4,461.00 per month and resided in St. George, Utah 
(Transcript P. 11, L. 19.); (Memorandum Decision, R. 155). 
4. At the time of trial, DiAnn had degrees in education and 
nursing (Transcript, P. 78, L. 15-16), but had elected not to work 
full-time outside the home (Transcript, P. 80, L. 17). In 1995, 
her income from nursing was $29,875 (Transcript P. 155) and, in 
1996, she earned $19,783.50 (Transcript, P. 110, L. 18) through 
October 12, 1996. Her gross monthly income at trial was $1,123.00 
(Transcript P. 100, L. 20) for 32 hours per week (Transcript P. 110 
L. 23.). 
5. During the marriage, DiAnn acquired a one-fifth (1/5) 
interest in Duke Farms, Inc., a farm owned by her parents 
(Transcript P. 82, L. 6-9). In the early 1970's, DiAnn's parents 
gifted to the parties one-third of an acre of raw ground in Heber, 
Utah (Transcript P. 84, L. 10-14). A home was built on the land by 
the parties valued by the Trial Court at $199,500.00, with a 
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current mortgage at the time of trial in the amount of $29,500.00. 
The value of the raw land was $42,000.00 (Memorandum Decision, R. 
156) . 
6. As a result of the parties' respective employment, Mr. 
Turner had a retirement plan with a cash value of $50,300.00, as of 
September 30, 1996, and DiAnn had a retirement plan with a cash 
value of $9,133.00 (Memorandum Decision, R. 157). 
7. The Court found that in addition to the mortgage, the 
parties had a USAA marital debt in the amount of $11,600.00 
(Memorandum Decision R. 159). 
8. At the time of trial, the parties' seven minor children, 
ranging in age from 6 to 18, resided in the home and in the sole 
custody of DiAnn who had changed her employment hours from evenings 
and weekends to days in order to care for the children, thereby 
losing a shift differential of $5.00 per hour (Transcript, P. 96, 
L. 11) . 
9. One child threatened suicide after the parties separated 
and the children were in counseling (Transcript, P. 98, L. 16-17). 
10. At the time of trial, DiAnn's monthly expenses totaled 
$2,830.00 (Memorandum Decision, R. 154). 
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VII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
DiAnn, on appeal, argues that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion and failed to make adequate Findings when it unjustly 
imputed income to her. The unrebuted plain evidence indicated that 
the unusual emotional and other needs of the children required her 
presence in the home. This required a change in her employment 
hours resulting in less income than she earned during the marriage 
when DiAnn and her husband co-parented the children. 
The Court failed to make adequate Findings as to its child 
support award for seven (7) minor children entitled to support and 
failed to require the filing of a Child Support Worksheet as 
required by Rule 4-912 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
The Court also erred and abused its discretion when it 
unjustly failed to award alimony to DiAnn. The Trial Court 
misplaced its reliance on Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d 304 
(Utah 1988) without making adequate Findings regarding whether or 
not her gifted asset (Duke Farms) was income producing or otherwise 
allowed DiAnn to meet her own needs. The Court made no Findings 
as to the need of DiAnn for alimony, the ability of Mr. Turner to 
pay alimony and the ability of DiAnn to provide for her own needs 
(and the needs of the children), the length of the marriage, and 
the fault of Turner resulting in both the divorce and DiAnnfs 
change in employment and loss of income. The Court failed to make 
Findings as to the effect imputed income had on her actual need for 
alimony. 
The Court also erred in ordering that Turner should receive 
the benefit of any appreciation in value of the home and the 
benefits of any pay down of the mortgage by DiAnn, pending payment 
to Turner of his equitable interest. Turner's equity was ordered 
to be paid upon the occurrence of the standard triggering events 
(death, remarriage, cohabitation, attainment of the age of majority 
by the youngest child). The Court failed to make Findings 
regarding the factors identified by the Utah Supreme Court in Burke 
v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), regarding its property 
distribution. 
Additionally, the Court erred in failing to make Findings 
regarding the ability of DiAnn to pay one-half (1/2) of the USAA 
debt and why it failed to award DiAnn her requested attorney's 
fees. 
In sum, the Supplemental Decree of Divorce is not supported by 
either the evidence or the law, or by adequate Findings of Fact, 
and the Court abused its discretion in making its Orders and awards 
thereunder, creating an unjust result. The resultant orders were 
based on legally insufficient Findings or lacked any Findings at 
all as required by Nilley v. Willey (333 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (Utah 
2 
1997) . This case should be remanded to the Trial Court for 
appropriate Findings, Watson v. Watson, 561 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1977) 
and DiAnn should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal. 
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VIII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Imputation of Income - Voluntary Underemployment. 
The Court erred in failing to make adequate and appropriate 
Findings as to whether or not Appellant was voluntarily 
underemployed as required by § 78-45-7.5 (7) (a) , (d) . The Trial 
Court must make adequate Findings of Fact to permit Appellant 
review. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993); Willey v. 
Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996); Willey v. Willey 333 Utah 
Adv. Rpt 8 (Utah 1997); Montoya v. Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1988) . 
Despite the unrebuted testimony of Appellant, DiAnn Turner, as 
to the unusual emotional and physical needs of the children 
requiring her presence in the home (Transcript P. 98, 99), the 
Court imputed income to DiAnn based upon her 1995 gross income. 
DiAnn testified that she changed her shifts at work from weekend 
and evenings to a day shift following the parties' separation 
(Transcript, Pgs. 96-97). The unrebuted testimony at trial was 
that DiAnn Turner was the sole custodial parent of seven minor 
children, ranging in age from 6 to 18 and that she needed to work 
days while her children were in school (Transcript, P. 98, L. 3). 
The children were suffering greatly and she had to take them to 
counseling and one child even threatened suicide (Transcript, P. 
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98, L. 15-17). DiAnn was concerned about their psychological 
health and a great deal of work was involved in taking care of the 
house and the seven children (Transcript P. 99) . 
As DiAnn testified at trial, "I go to work at 6:30. I 
generally get up at 5:00 o'clock in the morning. The washing 
machine never stops. I do 6 to 8 loads a day. I try not to wash 
on Sunday. If I am home, I scrub the floors every day. I bake 
from scratch. I make homemade breads and pies. I have a, (sic) my 
children are supposed to help in the house. They all have an 
assigned room, but since their father left, they said that they are 
not going to help. I am getting very little help from the 
children, so I am basically being the maid for 7 people." 
(Transcript. P. 99, L. 6-15.) 
The Court failed to make Findings as to whether or not the co-
parenting efforts of the parties prior to separation enabled DiAnn 
Turner to work weekends and evenings, whereby she could obtain a 
higher rate of pay and was available and capable to work more 
hours. (Transcript P. 96, L. 7-12.) 
DiAnn testified at trial in response to the question: "Let me 
ask you what is the reason you have found it necessary to cut back 
on your employment from the types of hours you had in 1994, when 
you were taking all of the overtime." DiAnn replied: "At that 
time, I was working mainly weekends and graveyards and it was 
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because my husband was available to tend the eight children that 
were at home. With him gone, I have to work days and it gives a 
decrease in hourly wage of $5.00 an hour." (Transcript. P. 96, L. 
3-11) . 
When the parties lived together, Mr. Turner worked a normal 
work week, Monday through Friday during the day, and each party was 
available in the home when the other one wasn!t there to take care 
of the children. (Transcript, P. 96, L. 23-25, P. 97 L. 1.) He 
has only visited the children twice since he moved to St. George. 
(Transcript P. 97, L. 19-25) His lack of assistance in parenting 
the children and visiting with them has made it impossible for 
DiAnn to work the hours she had before (Transcript. P. 98, L. 1-3) . 
The Court erred and abused its discretion when its sole finding was 
that "Defendant is employable, and able to work at a level above 
which she is currently employed." (Memorandum Decision, R. 157.) 
Section 78-45-7.5(7) (a) requires that a hearing must be held 
and a finding made that a parent is voluntarily underemployed and 
§ 78-45-7.5(7)(d)(iv) provides that income may not be imputed if 
the unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. Here, the fact that Mr. 
Turner resides some 300 miles from the seven remaining minor 
children in the home who have been in counseling and one of whom 
has threatened suicide required the Court to make Findings as to 
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its basis for imputing income to DiAnn other than "she is able to 
work at a level above which she is currently employed." (R. 157.) 
The Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Memorandum Decision (R. 154), 
and Supplemental Memorandum Decision (R. 189) are insufficient to 
allow imputation of income to DiAnn Turner and create an unjust and 
illegal result. 
Even if the Court were to establish child support based upon 
Findings sufficient to impute income to DiAnn, the Court pursuant 
to § 78-45-7.2(3), should have considered the evidence and made 
Findings as to whether or not the application of the guidelines 
would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interests of a 
child in this particular case. The guidelines are rebutable and, 
given the evidence before the Court of the work involved in meeting 
the needs of the seven children without alimony or cooperation from 
Turner, application of the guidelines under such circumstances is 
unjust and inappropriate. It would be in the best interests of the 
children under these circumstances for the Court to rebut the 
presumption of the application of the guidelines, given the fact 
that their father's co-parenting no longer existed and no alimony 
was awarded. 
The issue of a voluntary reduction of income has recently been 
thoroughly analyzed by Professor Louis Becker. In Becker's 
Connecticut Law Review article, "Spousal and Child Support and the 
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"Voluntary Reduction of Income Doctrine1" (Connecticut Law Review, 
Vol. 29, # 2, Winter 1997), Becker describes three tests used by 
various jurisdictions in analyzing the voluntary reduction of 
income for child support purposes. Some Courts apply a strict rule 
and place the sole priority on the support obligation. Professor 
Becker opines that the "strict test" is too inflexible and is 
fatally flawed in that it disregards all facts other than the 
support obligation and fails to consider any other interest of the 
beneficiary of the support order. The Turner children, 
beneficiaries of DiAnn1s support obligation, also benefit from 
DiAnn1s homemaking skills and parenting. Application of a strict 
test does not allow a balancing of interests sufficient to 
determine what is in the best interests the Turner children. Are 
the children's best interests served by imputing additional income 
to DiAnn in order to reduce Mr. Turner's support obligation or are 
their best interest's served by increasing Mr. Turner's share of 
the support obligation in order to allow DiAnn to care for the 
children during the difficult days following separation of their 
parents and thereafter? The Trial Court allowed Turner to escape 
his parenting and financial responsibilities when it unjustly 
punished DiAnn by imputing income to her and not awarding alimony 
to her. 
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The second test, "good faith," used by some other courts gives 
less weight to the support obligation and more to the motivation of 
the obligor. Under that test, the facts of this case would allow 
DiAnn to voluntarily reduce her income based on her good faith 
efforts to supplant the lack of co-parenting by Mr. Turner 
following the parties* separation. Should this Court choose to 
apply the good faith test, it is clear that DiAnnfs motivation in 
reducing her income and changing her shifts from evenings and 
weekends to a day shift so that she can work when the children are 
at school is in good faith and no income would be imputed to her. 
The "intermediate test" advocated by Becker balances support 
obligations with the best interests of the children and allows 
flexibility. Becker's article asserts that there is an increasing 
trend in the adoption of an intermediate approach in the context of 
employment related decisions. Becker proposes that the 
intermediate test be comprised of the reasons for underemployment 
asserted by the party whose conduct is at issue, the impact upon 
the obligee in considering the actual earnings of the obligor and 
whether the party complaining of the voluntary reduction in income 
acquiesced in the conduct of the other party, and finally, the 
timing of the action in question in relation to the entering of a 
Decree. 
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The evidence at trial was that DiAnn Turner was forced to cut 
back on her hours and readjust her schedule because Mr. Turner 
moved to St. George and was unable to fulfill his share of the 
parenting duties of the parties' seven children (Transcript P. 96, 
L. 7-11). Had the Court awarded alimony to DiAnn, Mr. Turner might 
have an argument against any increase in his child support 
obligation as a result of DiAnn's underemployment. The evidence at 
trial demonstrated that prior to separation, both parties arranged 
their work schedules so that someone could be in the home with the 
children when the other was at work (Transcript Pgs. 96-97). 
Because of Turner's acquiescence to that situation, he should be 
estopped from claiming that DiAnn should be assessed a percentage 
of child support based on an income she was no longer able to earn 
after their separation while she fulfilled his parenting duties. 
Some jurisdictions have held that the court need not consider 
a parent's earning capacity if the voluntary underemployment is in 
the best interests of the children; Olsen v. Olsen, 620 N.W.2d 
(N.D. 1994) . Some courts have held that a downward modification of 
a child support order is appropriate if it allows a parent to 
exercise visitation rights. Mull in v. Mull in, 634 N.E.2d 1340 
(Ind. App. 1994) . This Court should consider adopting a flexible 
approach to balance earning ability with the parenting needs of the 
children in order to serve the best interests of the beneficiaries 
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of the support award. Such an approach is consistent with the 
policy considerations raised by §§ 78-45-7.2(3) and 78-45-
7.5(7) (d) . 
Because § 78-45-7.2 provides that the child support guidelines 
may be rebutted in the event they appear to be unjust, 
inappropriate or not in the best interests of the child, DiAnn 
submits that this Court should apply an intermediate test and 
balance the difference between DiAnn's actual income and her 
historical income against the benefits of her working when the 
children are in school and being home when they are not in order to 
meet their needs to determine what is in the best interests of the 
children, thereby rebutting the Guidelines. The Court failed to 
make Findings in response to DiAnn!s claims regarding the 
childrens1 needs and the plain evidence at trial and, therefore, 
this case should be remanded for adequate Findings. Montoya v. 
Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1988), Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1977) . 
B. Child Support Award for More than Six Children. 
The Trial Court awarded DiAnn the sum of $1,452.80 for child 
support (Memorandum Decision R. 157). The Court made no Findings 
of Fact supporting its award of child support other than the award 
was based on the income of the parties. Despite the fact that Rule 
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4-912 of the Code of Judicial Administration mandates that " . . . 
the Court shall not enter the final decree of divorce, . . . until 
the completed [child support] worksheet is filed", no child support 
worksheet has been filed in connection with the Supplemental Decree 
of Divorce. 
The base combined child support obligation table (§ 78-45-
7.14) provides combined child support obligations for up to six 
children. Section 78-45-7.7(4) provides that "[F]or more than six 
children, additional amounts may be added to the base support 
obligation shown. Unless rebutted by § 78-45-7.2(3), the amount 
ordered shall not be less than the amount which shall be ordered 
for up to six children." Because there is no child support 
worksheet or additional findings to support the Court's child 
support award of $1,452.80, appellate review of the Court's child 
support award is impossible. The child support obligation for the 
combined gross income of the parties as found by the Trial Court 
for six children is $2,134.00. Assuming arguendo, that Mr. 
Turner's share of the total child support obligation for six 
children would have been $1,387.10, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion when it awarded an additional $65.70 to DiAnn for the 
one (1) additional child not contemplated by the child support 
obligation tables (Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985)) . 
An extrapolation of the child support obligation for seven children 
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from the figures used in the tables for six children would result 
in a child support award of $1,578.00, using DiAnn's imputed income 
of $2,490.00. Using DiAnn's actual income of $1,123.00 per month 
would result in an extrapolated child support award of $1,725.00. 
While extrapolation may not be the appropriate way to 
determine a child support obligation for income in excess of the 
tables1, the Trial Court should be required to make Findings as to 
any additional amounts it awards when there are more than six 
children. The extrapolated child support worksheets are attached 
to this Brief as Addenda "A" and "B." 
At trial, Turner offered a 7-child worksheet (R. P. 35), 
whereby he "took the difference between 5 and 6 and added the same 
amount to make up for the next column" (Transcript P. 29, L. 18) . 
The fallacy in this approach to determine the correct support 
amount for children in excess of 6 is that the per child 
progressive increase varies for each additional child. Using the 
Turners' income, the difference between 5 and 6 children is 
$136.00. The difference between 4 and 5 children is $164.00, 3 and 
^Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d (Utah App. 1996). The public policy concerns that a linear extrapolation of a 
support obligation for income in excess of the tables could vastly exceed any reasonable need for support are 
distinguishable from an extrapolation of the number of children in excess of die table. Each additional child still has 
a need for support. Hie per child amount of support using DiAnn's actual income is $308.00 and the base combined 
support obligation is $2,156.00 after being extrapolated to 7 children (Addenda "B") and $355.00 per child using 
DiAnn's imputed income (Addenda "A"), clearly a reasonable amount of child support for each child's need. DiAnn 
recognizes that on remand the issue of extrapolation for 7 children will be moot as the seventh will have graduated 
from high school. 
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4 is $323.00, 2 and 3 is $323.00 and 1 and 2 is $508.00. Why 
should the first additional child need $508.00 of support and the 
7th only $134.00? The Court made no Findings as to Turner's 
worksheet objected to by Di Ann (Transcript P. 28, L. 11). 
C. The Court Abused its Discretion and Erred in Failing to 
Award Alimony to Appellant and for Failing to Render 
Appropriate Findings. 
The Trial Court, apparently hanging its hat on Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), failed to award to the 
Plaintiff alimony. (R. 155.) 
Section 30-3-5(7) sets forth the considerations for the Court 
in determining alimony. The law is well-settled that for the court 
to award or not to award alimony to a party, it must make adequate 
and appropriate Findings. {Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 421 (Utah 
App. 1990.) {Willey v. Willey) (supra) . Those Findings must address 
the need of the recipient for alimony, the ability of the payor to 
pay alimony and the recipient's ability to provide for her own 
support. {Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990); 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991)). Without making 
any Findings regarding whether or not the family farm known as Duke 
Farms provided an income to DiAnn, the Court determined that the 
mere fact that it awarded to DiAnn her gifted interest in Duke 
Farms is a sufficient reason not to award alimony to her 
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(Memorandum Decision R. 158) . Mortensen, supra, requires Findings 
as to whether the separate property is income producing. 760 P.2d 
at 308. The Court also failed to analyze the pertinent 
circumstances as required by Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133 (Utah 
1987). No Findings were made as to the parties1 standard of 
living, their health, financial condition, duration of the 
marriage, the children, the relationship between property division 
and the amount of alimony and child support awarded. 733 P.2d at 
135. 
The Court failed to make any Findings as to whether or not 
DiAnn, given the fact that she had to change her employment shift 
work from weekends and evenings to a day shift, thereby reducing 
her hourly income by $5.00 per hour, had the ability to provide for 
her own needs without considering the best interest of the children 
and her "voluntary underemployment." Additionally, by imputing 
income to her at a higher rate than she actually earned, the Court 
further abused its discretion resulting in an unjust order 
regarding alimony. As a result of DiAnn1s assuming Turner's share 
of the child rearing responsibility and a larger percentage of the 
child support obligation, the Court doubly punished DiAnn: no 
alimony and less child support. 
The Court heard testimony at trial that Mr. Turner had no 
expenses for housing and that his monthly income was $4,661.00 
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(Transcript P. 42, L. 12-14). The Court failed to make any 
Findings as to whether or not Mr. Turner had the ability to pay 
alimony to DiAnn. Based upon DiAnn1s actual income as testified to 
at trial in the amount of $1,123.00 per month (Transcript P. 96), 
the Court abused its discretion by failing to make Findings as to 
DiAnn1s need for alimony, Turner's ability to pay or DiAnn1s 
ability to meet her own needs. Imputed income is not real income 
nor does it help DiAnn meet her own needs. DiAnn's monthly 
expenses at trial were found to be $2,830 (R. 158). Her income was 
$1,123 (Tr. P. 100, L. 22), and she was awarded $1,452.00 in child 
support, leaving her with a shortfall of $255.00 per month. 
The Court gave lip service to the length of the parties' 
marriage (R. 158), but failed to consider it when making Findings 
as to whether or not the length of the marriage (30 years) impacted 
on the Court's decision not to award alimony to DiAnn as required 
by § 30-3-5(7) . The Court also failed to consider the fault of Mr. 
Turner in the break-up of the marriage as a factor in considering 
alimony and failed to enter Findings as to whether or not Turner's 
decision to move to St. George and not help DiAnn co-parent the 
children, was a fault-based factor relative to an alimony award. 
(U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7) (b) ; Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988).) 
When the Court imputed income to DiAnn, the imputed income is 
not money that DiAnn earns and therefore could not be used towards 
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meeting her own needs for the purposes of alimony. When the Court 
entered a Finding that she was voluntarily underemployed, it needed 
to make additional Findings whether or not that factor precluded 
her from receiving alimony. In fact, by ordering child support 
based on imputed income, the Court created a requirement for a 
specific finding that her voluntary underemployment to provide for 
the children prevented her from being awarded alimony. 
The Court failed to make adequate Findings as to the parties' 
standard of living during the marriage. Their combined 1995 gross 
monthly income was $6,951.00 per month. How DiAnn could maintain 
a similar standard of living on an actual income of $1,123.00 per 
month or why it was not a factor in declining to award alimony 
requires a specific Finding by the Court which is lacking in the 
Court's ruling. (Memorandum Decision, R. 158.) 
D. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding to Appellee 
any Benefit or Increase in Equity Resulting from the Pay 
down of the Mortgage by Appellant or the Appreciation in 
Value of the Marital Home Prior to Payment by Appellant 
of Appellee's Equity. 
As was previously discussed above, the Court awarded no 
alimony to DiAnn Turner. However, the Court ordered that she pay 
to Mr. Turner one-half of the equity in the marital home based upon 
the total amount of equity at the time Mr. Turner's equity is paid 
to him (Supplemental Memorandum Decision, R. 190) . The Court also 
prevented DiAnn from obtaining a new or second mortgage or 
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collateralizing the home in order to pay to him his equity so that 
he would not receive the benefit of her pay down of the mortgage or 
the appreciation of the home pending occurrence of one of the 
triggering events described in the Supplemental Divorce Decree 
(attaining of majority by the parties' youngest child, remarriage, 
cohabitation, death of DiAnn, or sale of the home) . (Supplemental 
Decree, R. 197, 198.) 
By preventing DiAnn from refinancing the home in order to pay 
Turner's equity and by not providing her with the ability to 
otherwise pay the equity by awarding alimony to her or reducing her 
share of the child support obligation, the Court unjustly allowed 
Mr. Turner to obtain the benefit of a pay down by DiAnn of the 
mortgage and deprived her of the benefit of any appreciation in 
value of the home pending payment of Mr. Turner's equity. 
The parties' youngest child is 6 years of age (R. P. 2), and 
should DiAnn choose not to sell the home until the youngest child 
attains its majority, she may pay on the mortgage for at least the 
next twelve years. It is unfair and inequitable for Turner to 
benefit from DiAnn's efforts in maintaining the mortgage for the 
next twelve years when he receives the benefit of DiAnn's imputed 
income and pays no alimony. The Trial Court erred when it failed 
to make Findings as to DiAnn's ability to refinance the home or 
otherwise obtain Mr. Turner's share of the equity independent of 
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the ultimate sale of the home to prevent him from unjustly 
benefitting from her efforts. The Trial Court also failed to make 
any findings as to why DiAnn was prohibited from mortgaging the 
marital home (R. 197). Burke v. Burke, supra. 
When the Court found that DiAnn, by having use of the home as 
she raises the seven (7) children, receives a benefit to her that 
must be shared with Turner who does not contribute to the child-
raising chore or payment of the mortgage without making Findings, 
it further abused its discretion (Supplemental Memorandum Decision, 
R. 190) . 
In paragraph 2 of the Supplemental Memorandum Decision (R. 
190) , the Court ruled that "If Defendant wishes to prevent 
Plaintiff from benefitting from Defendant's pay down of the 
mortgage, Defendant can choose to buy-out Plaintiff's interest in 
the home." The Court failed to make adequate Findings as to how 
she could buy it out or whether she even had the ability to do so. 
Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993); {Burke v. Burke) 
supra. 
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E. The USAA Debt. 
The Court erred in failing to require Mr. Turner to pay the 
USAA debt in its entirety. Mr. Turner's Divorce Complaint alleged 
that he should pay the debt and hold DiAnn harmless from it (R. P. 
7). The Court failed to make any Findings as to either party's 
ability to pay that debt, the source of the debt or any other 
factor relative to the debt except that it was a "marital debt" 
(Memorandum Decision, R. 159). Without awarding sufficient child 
support or alimony to DiAnn, specific and detailed Findings should 
have been made to justify what appears to be an unjust order 
regarding the debt. 
F. Attorney's Fees-
The Court failed to make sufficient Findings regarding DiAnn's 
need for attorney's fees or Mr. Turner's ability to pay her fees. 
{Willey v„ Willey, Utah 1997.) The Court failed to make adequate 
Findings as to why DiAnn's requested attorney's fees of $4,73 6.00 
(R. 118) were not awarded or why it awarded $1,650.00 (R. 191). 
DiAnn requests additional attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 292 P.214 (Utah 1930); Peterson v. Peterson, 
189 P.2d 961 (Utah 1948) . 
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IX. 
CONCLUSION. 
The Court made insufficient or no Findings whatsoever 
regarding its determination that DiAnn was voluntarily 
underemployed, that application of the Child Support Guidelines 
would be unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interests of the 
children, or whether or not the unusual emotional or physical needs 
of the children required DiAnn's presence in the home. The Court 
failed to support its child support award with a worksheet or make 
Findings as to its child support award. The Court, in refusing to 
award alimony, made no Findings as to whether or not DiAnn had the 
ability to meet her own needs or needed support from Mr. Turner, 
whether or not Mr. Turner had the ability to support DiAnn, and 
whether or not the length of the marriage, the parties' prior 
standard of living, or the fault of Mr. Turner should be 
considered by the Court in making a determination regarding 
alimony. 
Appellant requests this Court remand this matter to the Trial 
Court for adequate and appropriate Findings relative to the issue 
of voluntary underemployment, special or unusual needs of the 
children, and their best interests. The failure of the Trial Court 
to award DiAnn alimony was clearly an abuse of discretion creating 
an unjust result. 
21 
The Court failed to make adequate and appropriate orders 
regarding disposition of the marital home and payment of Turner's 
equity and DiAnn's ability or lack of ability to obtain a source to 
pay to Mr. Turner his one-half of the equity. No Findings were 
made regarding the parties' ability to pay the USAA debt or the 
reasons why the Trial Court awarded less than the amount of 
attorney's fees requested by DiAnn. 
DATED this /^/day of February, /JL998 . 
Respectfcully submitted, 
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CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
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the foregoing uo: 
Terry L. Christiansen 
1920 Prospector Square 
P.O. Box 680284 
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Addendum A 
Steven Kuhnhausen (1861) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Mel von David Turner, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DiAnn Carol Turner, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(Sole Custody and Paternity) 
Civil No. *DA 
1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and 
father for whom support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to 
Instructions for definitions of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case.) 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter 
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1.) 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in 
Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted 
Gross Income for child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of 
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined 
Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the 
COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's 
1 share of the Base Support Obligation. 
MOTHER 
$ 2,490.00 
-0-
-0-
$ 2,490.00 
35% 
$9961)0 
FATHER 
$4,461.00 
-0-
-0-
$4,461.00 
65% 
$1,578.00 
COMBINED 
7 
$6,951.00 
$ 2,489.00 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor 
Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table. $ 1,578.00 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother ( X ) Father 
Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7 ? ( ) Yes 
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $ , and answer number 10. 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( X ) other: extrapolated from six to seven children 
(X)No 
) Electronic filing 
': \wpdata\forms\child. sol 
( ) Manual filing 
Addendum B 
Steven Kuhnhausen (1861) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Mel von David Turner, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DiAnn Carol Turner, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(Sole Custody and Paternity) 
Civil No. *DA 
1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and 
father for whom support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to 
Instructions for definitions of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case.) 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter 
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1.) 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in 
Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted 
Gross Income for child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of 
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined 
Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the 
COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's 
1 share of the Base Support Obligation. 
MOTHER 
$ 1,123.00 
-0-
-0-
$ 1,123.00 
20% 
_J>_ J31^0 
FATHER 
$4,461.00 
-0-
-0-
$4,461.00 
80% 
$1,725.00 
COMBINED 
7 
$ 5,584.00 
$2,156.00 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the Obligor 
Parent or enter the amount from the Low Income Table. $ 1,725.00 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother ( X ) Father 
Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7 ? ( ) Yes 
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $ , and answer number 10. 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( X ) other: extrapolated from six to seven children 
(X)No 
( ) Electronic filing 
C :\wpdata\forms\child. sol 
( ) Manual filing 
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78-45-7.14 JUDICIAL CODE 
Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income Number of Children 
3 4 
From 
6,701 -
6,801 -
6,901 -
7,001 -
7,101 -
7,201 -
7,301 -
7,401 -
7,501 -
7,601 -
7,701 -
7,801 -
7,901 -
8,001 -
8,101 -
8,201 -
8,301 -
8,401 -
8,501 -
8,601 -
8,701 -
8,801 -
8,901 -
9,001 -
9,101 -
9,201 -
9,301 -
9,401 -
9,501 -
9,601 -
9,701 -
9,801 -
9,901 -
10,001 -
Monthly Adj 
lb 
6,800 
6,900 
7,000 
7,100 
7,200 
7,300 
7,400 
7,500 
7,600 
7,700 
7,800 
7,900 
8,000 
8,100 
8,200 
8,300 
8,400 
8,500 
8,600 
8,700 
8,800 
8,900 
9,000 
9,100 
9,200 
9,300 
9,400 
9,500 
9,600 
9,700 
9,800 
9,900 
10,000 
10,100 
Gross Income 
629 
673 
680 
687 
694 
701 
706 
710 
715 
719 
723 
728 
732 
737 
741 
746 
750 
755 
759 
763 
768 
772 
777 
781 
786 
790 
795 
799 
803 
808 
812 
817 
821 
826 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,189 
1,197 
1,205 
1,213 
1,220 
1,228 
1,236 
1,244 
1,252 
1,259 
1,267 
1,275 
1,283 
1,291 
1,298 
1,306 
1,314 
1,322 
1,330 
1,337 
1,345 
1,353 
1,361 
1,369 
1,376 
1,384 
1,392 
1,400 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,520 
1,531 
1,541 
1,551 
1,562 
1,572 
1,582 
1,592 
1,603 
1,613 
1,623 
1,633 
1,644 
1,654 
1,664 
1,675 
1,685 
1,695 
1,705 
1,716 
1,726 
1,736 
1,747 
1,757 
1,767 
1,777 
1,788 
1,798 
1,808 
LOW INCOME TABLE 
(Obligor Parent Only) 
1 2 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,841 
1,853 
1,864 
1,876 
1,887 
1,899 
1,911 
1,922 
1,934 
1,945 
1,957 
1,969 
1,980 
1,992 
2,003 
2,015 
2,027 
2,038 
2,050 
2,061 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
2,000 
2,013 
2,026 
2,039 
2,052 
2,064 
2,077 
2,090 
2,103 
2,116 
2,129 
2,141 
2,154 
2,167 
2,180 
2,193 
2,206 
2,218 
2,231 
2,244 
2,257 
2,270 
Number of Children 
3 4 5 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,137 
2,150 
2,164 
2,178 
2,192 
2,206 
2,220 
2,234 
2,247 
2,261 
2,275 
2,289 
2,303 
2,317 
2,330 
2,344 
2,358 
2,372 
2,386 
2,400 
2,414 
2,427 
2,441 
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From To 
650 - 675 
676 - 700 
23 
45 
23 
46 
23 
46 
23 
47 
24 
47 
24 
48 
710 
